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Abstract—One of the main challenges faced by Biometric-
based authentication systems is the need to offer secure au-
thentication while maintaining the privacy of the biometric
data. Previous solutions, such as Secure Sketch and Fuzzy
Extractors, rely on assumptions that cannot be guaranteed in
practice, and often affect the authentication accuracy.
In this paper, we introduce HoneyFaces: the concept of
adding a large set of synthetic faces (indistinguishable from
real) into the biometric “password file”. This password inflation
protects the privacy of users and increases the security of the
system without affecting the accuracy of the authentication. In
particular, privacy for the real users is provided by “hiding”
them among a large number of fake users (as the distributions
of synthetic and real faces are equal). In addition to main-
taining the authentication accuracy, and thus not affecting
the security of the authentication process, HoneyFaces offer
several security improvements: increased exfiltration hardness,
improved leakage detection, and the ability to use a Two-
server setting like in HoneyWords. Finally, HoneyFaces can
be combined with other security and privacy mechanisms for
biometric data.
We implemented the HoneyFaces system and tested it with
a password file composed of 270 real users. The “password file”
was then inflated to accommodate up to 236.5 users (resulting
in a 56.6 TB “password file”). At the same time, the inclusion of
additional faces does not affect the true acceptance rate or false
acceptance rate which were 93.33% and 0.01%, respectively.
Index Terms—Biometrics (access control), Face Recognition,
Privacy
1. Introduction
Biometric authentication systems are becoming preva-
lent in access control and in consumer technology. In such
systems, the user submits their user name and his/her bio-
metric sample, which is compared to the stored biometric
template associated with this user name (one-to-one match-
ing).1 The popularity of biometric-based systems stems from
1. We note that one-to-many solutions (where the biometrics is compared
to that of all users in the system) demand significantly larger computational
effort, and are used in systems where there is no user cooperation.
a popular belief that such authentication systems are more
secure and user friendly than systems based on passwords.
At the same time, the use of such systems raises concerns
about the security and privacy of the stored biometric data.
Unlike passwords, replacing a compromised biometric trait
is impossible, since biometric traits (e.g., face, fingerprint,
and iris) are considered to be unique. Therefore, the security
of biometric templates is an important issue when consider-
ing biometric based systems. Moreover, poor protection of
the biometric templates can have serious privacy implica-
tions on the user, as discussed in previous work [27], [35].
Various solutions have been proposed for protecting
biometric templates (e.g, [27], [35]). The most prominent
of them are secure sketch [18] and fuzzy extractors [6]. Un-
fortunately, these solutions are not well adopted in practice.
The first reason for this is the tradeoff between security and
usability due to the degradation in recognition rates [36].
The second reason is related to the use of tokens that are
required for storing the helper data, thus affecting usability.
Finally, these mechanisms rely on assumptions which are
hard to verify (e.g., the privacy guarantees of secure sketch
assume that the biometric trait is processed into an almost
full entropy string).
In this work we propose a different approach for protect-
ing biometric templates called HoneyFaces. In this approach,
we hide the real biometric templates among a very large
number of synthetic templates that are indistinguishable
from the real ones. Thus, identifying real users in the system
becomes a very difficult ‘needle in a haystack’ problem.
At the same time, HoneyFaces does not require the use of
tokens nor does it affect recognition rate (compared to a
system that does not provide any protection mechanism).
Furthermore, it can be integrated with other privacy so-
lutions (e.g., secure sketch), offering additional layers of
security and privacy.
For the simplicity of the discussion, let us assume that
all biometric templates (real and synthetic) are stored in a
biometric “password file”. Our novel approach enables the
size of this file to be increased by several orders of magni-
tudes. Such inflation offers a 4-tier defense mechanism for
protecting the security and privacy of biometric templates
with no usability overhead. Namely, HoneyFaces:
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• Reduces the risk of the biometric password file
leaking;
• Increases the probability that such a leak is detected
online;
• Allows for post-priori detection of the (biometric)
password file leakage;
• Protects the privacy of the biometrics in the case of
leakage;
In the following we specify how this mechanism works and
its applications in different settings.
The very large size of the “password file” improves the
resilience of system against its exfiltration. We show that
one can inflate a system with 270 users (180 KB “pass-
word file”) into a system with up to 236.5 users (56.6 TB
“password file”). Obviously, exfiltrating such a huge amount
of information is hard. Moreover, by forcing the adversary
to leak a significantly larger amount of data (due to the
inflated file) he either needs significantly more time, or has
much higher chances of being caught by Intrusion Detection
Systems. Thus, the file inflation facilitates in detecting the
leakage while it happens.
The advantages of increasing the biometric “password
file” can be demonstrated in networks whose outgoing
bandwidth is very limited, such as air-gap networks (e.g.,
those considered in [28], [30]). Such networks are usually
deployed in high-security restricted areas, and thus are
expected to employ biometric authentication, possibly in
conjunction with other authentication mechanisms. Once an
adversary succeeds in infiltrating the network, he usually has
a very limited bandwidth for exfiltration, typically using a
physical communication channel of limited capacity (with a
typical bandwidth of less than 1 Kbit/sec). In such networks,
inflating the size of the database increases the resilience
against exfiltration of the database. Namely, exfiltrating 180
KB of information (the size of a biometric “password file”
in a system with 270 users) takes a reasonable time even in
low bandwidth channels compared with 56.6 TB (the size
of the inflated biometric “password file”), which takes more
than 5.2 days for exfiltration in 1 Gbit/sec, 14.4 years in 1
Mbit/sec, or about 14,350 years from an air-gaped network
at the speed of 1 Kbit/sec.
Similarly to HoneyWords [17], the fake accounts enable
detection of leaked files. Namely, by using two-server
authentication settings, each authentication query is first sent
to the server that contains the inflated password file. Once
the first server authenticates the user, it sends a query to
the second server that contains only the legitimate accounts,
thus detecting whether a fake account was invoked with the
“correct” credentials. This is a clear evidence that despite
the hardness of exfiltration, the password file (or a part of
it) was leaked.
All the above guarantees heavily rely on the inability
of the adversary to isolate the real users from the fake
ones. We show that this task is nearly impossible in various
adversarial settings (when the adversary has obtained access
to the password file). We also show that running membership
queries to identify a real user by matching a facial image
from an external source to the biometric “password file” is
computationally infeasible.2 We analyze the robustness of
the system in the worst case scenario in which the adversary
has the facial images of all users except one and he tries
to locate the unknown user among the synthetic faces. We
show that the system protects the privacy of the users in this
case too. To conclude, HoneyFaces protects the biometric
templates of real users in all settings that can be protected.
The addition of a large number of synthetic faces may
raise a concern about the degradation of the authentication
accuracy. However, we show that this is not the case. The
appearance of faces follows a multivariate Gaussian distri-
bution, which we refer to in this article as face-space, the
parameters of which are learned from a set of real faces,
including the faces of the system users. We sample synthetic
faces from the same generative model constraining them to
be at a certain distance from real and other synthetic faces.
We selected this distance to be sufficiently large that new
samples of real users would not collide with the synthetic
ones. Even though such a constraint limits the number
of faces the system could produce, the number remains
very large. Using a training set of 500 real faces to build
the generative face model, we successfully created 236.5
synthetic faces.
1.1. Problem Statement
Our HoneyFaces system requires a method for generat-
ing synthetic faces which satisfies three requirements:
• The system should be able to generate a (very) large
number of unique synthetic faces.
• These synthetic faces should be indistinguishable
from real faces.
• The synthetic faces should not affect the authentica-
tion accuracy of real users.
These requirements ensure that the faces of the real users can
hide among the synthetic ones, without affecting recognition
accuracy.
1.2. Relation to Previous Work
There are two lines of research related to the ideas
introduced in this paper. One of them is HoneyObjects,
discussed in Section 1.3. The second one, discussed in
Section 1.4, is the synthesis of biometric traits.
1.3. HoneyObjects
HoneyObjects are widely used in computer security. The
use of honeypot users (fake accounts) is an old trick used by
system administrators. Login attempts to such accounts are a
strong indication that the password file has leaked. Later, the
2. We alert the reader that for any identification system, once the adver-
sary obtains all the user’s credentials (user name, biometric, token, etc.)
and the password file, she can easily and efficiently perform a membership
query by an attempted login.
concept of Honeypots and Honeynets was developed [26].
These tools are used to lure adversaries into attacking decoy
systems, thus exposing their tools and strategies. Honeypots
and Honeynets became widely used and deployed in the
computer security world, and play an important role in the
mitigation of cyber risks.
Recently, Juels and Rivest introduced HoneyWords [17],
a system offering decoy passwords in addition to the correct
one. A user first authenticates to the main server using a
standard password-based authentication in which the server
can keep track of the number of failed attempts. Once one
of the stored passwords is used, the server passes the query
to a second server which stores only the correct password.
Identification of the use of a decoy password by the second
server, suggests that the password file has leaked. Obviously,
just like in Honeypots and Honeynets, one needs to make
sure that the decoy passwords are sampled from the same
space as the real passwords (or from a space as close as
possible). To this end, there is a need to model passwords
correctly, a non-trivial task, which was approached in several
works [17], [24], [38]. Interestingly, we note that modeling
human faces was extensively studied and very good models
exist (see the discussion in Section 2).3
In HoneyWords it is a simple matter to change a user’s
password once if it has been compromised. Clearly it is
not practicable to change an individual’s facial appearance.
Thus, when biometric data is employed, the biometric “pass-
word file” itself should be protected. HoneyFaces protects
the biometric data by inflating the “password file” such that
it prevents leaks, which is a significant difference between
HoneyWords and HoneyFaces.
Another decoy mechanism suggested recently, though
not directly related to our work, is Honey Encryption [16].
This is an encryption procedure which generates ciphertexts
that are decrypted to different (yet plausible) plaintexts when
decrypted under one of a few wrong keys, thus making
ciphertext-only exhaustive search harder.
1.4. Biometric Traits Synthesis
Artificial biometric data are understood as biologically
meaningful data for existing biometric systems [40]. Bio-
metric data synthesis was suggested for different biometric
traits, such as faces (e.g., [2], [11], [31], [32]), fingerprints
(e.g, [1], [3], [14], [19]) and iris (e.g., [5], [22], [42]). The
main application of biometrics synthesis has been augment-
ing training sets and validation of biometric identification
and authentication systems (see [40] for more information
on synthesis of biometrics). Synthetic faces are also used in
animation, facial composite construction, and experiments
in cognitive psychology.
Making realistic synthetic biometric traits has been the
main goal of all these methods. However, the majority of
3. Our idea of significantly inflating the password file by adding many
fake accounts can also be used in the case of non-biometric authentication
systems. In addition to the security gain offered by fake accounts, the
increased size of the password file makes exfiltration attempts harder.
previous work did not address the question of distinguishing
the synthetic samples from the real ones.
The work in iris synthesis [22], [42] analyses the quality
of artificial samples by clustering synthetic, real, and non-
iris images into two clusters iris/non-iris. Such a problem
definition is obviously sub-optimal for measuring indistin-
guishability. Supervised learning using real and synthetic
data labels has much better chances of success in separat-
ing between real and synthetic samples than unsupervised
clustering (a weaker learning algorithm) into iris/non-iris
groups. These methods also used recognition experiments,
in which they compare the similarity of the associated
parameters derived from real and synthetic inputs. Again,
this is an indirect comparison that shows the suitability
of the generation method for evaluating the quality of the
recognition algorithm, but it is not enough for testing the
indistinguishability between real and synthetic samples.
In fingerprints, it was shown that synthetic samples
generated by different methods could be distinguished from
the real ones with high accuracy [13]. Subsequent methods
for synthesis [14] showed better robustness against distin-
guishing attacks that use statistical tests based on [13].
Several methods for synthetic facial image genera-
tion [11], [31] provide near photo-realistic representations,
but to the best of our knowledge, the question of indistin-
guishability between real and synthetic faces has not been
addressed before.
1.5. Organization of the Paper
Section 2 describes, with justification, the method we
use for generating HoneyFaces. In Section 3 we present our
setup for employing HoneyFaces in a secure authentication
system. The privacy analysis of HoneyFaces, discussed in
Section 4, shows that the adversary cannot obtain private
biometric information from the biometric “password file”.
Section 5 analyses the additional security offered by inflat-
ing the “password file”. We conclude the paper in Section 6.
2. Generating HoneyFaces Images
Biometric systems take a raw sample (usually an image)
and process it to extract features or a representation vector,
robust (as much as possible) to changes in sampling con-
ditions. In the HoneyFaces system, we have an additional
requirement — the feature space should allow sampling
of artificial “outcomes” (faces) in large numbers. These
synthetic faces will be used as the passwords of the fake
users.
Different models have been proposed for generating and
representing faces including, active appearance models [4],
3D deformable models [2], and convolutional neural net-
works [21], [41]. Such models have been used in face recog-
nition, computer animation, facial composite construction
(an application in law enforcement), and experiments in
cognitive psychology.
Among these models we choose the active appearance
model [4] for implementing the HoneyFaces concept. An
Figure 1. Shape vector x (center) and the shape free texture vector g (right) used to obtain the AM coefficient of a facial image (left).
active appearance model is a parametric statistical model
that encodes facial variation, extracted from images, with
respect to a mean face. This work has been extended and
improved in many subsequent papers (e.g., [23], [34], [39]).
In this context the word ‘active’ refers to fitting the ap-
pearance model (AM) to an unknown face to subsequently
achieve automatic face recognition [9]. AM can also be used
with random number generation to create plausible, yet com-
pletely synthetic, faces. These models achieve near photo-
realistic representations that preserve identity, although are
less effective at modeling hair and finer details, such as birth
marks, scars, or wrinkles which exhibit little or no spatial
correspondence between individuals.
Our choice of using the AM for HoneyFaces is motivated
by two reasons: 1) The representation of faces within an AM
is consistent with human visual perception and hence also
consistent with the notion of face-space [37]. In particular,
perceptual similarity of faces is correlated with distance in
AM space [20]. 2) AM is a well understood model used
previously in face synthesis (e.g. [11], [31]).
Alternative face models may also be considered, pro-
vided a sufficient number of training images (as the func-
tions of the representation length) is available to adequately
model the facial variation within the population of real
faces. Recent face recognition technology uses deep learning
(DL) methods as they provide very good representations for
verification. However, the image reconstruction quality from
DL representation is still far from being satisfactory for our
application.
2.1. Face representation using AM coefficients
AMs describe the variation contained within the training
set of faces, used for its construction. Given that this set
spans all variations associated with identity changes, the
AM provides a good approximation to any desired face. This
approximation is represented by a point (or more precisely,
localized contiguous region) within the face-space, defined
by the AM coefficients. The distribution of AM coefficients
of faces belonging to the same ethnicity are well approxi-
mated by an independent, multivariate, Gaussian probability
density function [11], [23], [34], [39] (for example, see
Figure 5 that presents the distribution of the first 21 AM
coefficients for a face-space constructed from 500 faces.)
New instances of facial appearance, the synthetic faces, can
be obtained by randomly sampling from such a distribution.
For simplicity, hereafter we assume that faces belong to
a single ethnicity. To accommodate faces from different
ethnic backgrounds, the same concept could be used with
the mixture of Gaussians distribution.
We follow the procedure for AM construction, proposed
in [11]. The training set of facial images, taken under the
same viewing conditions, is annotated using a point model
that delineates the face shape and the internal facial features.
In this process, 22 landmarks are manually placed on each
facial image. Based on these points, 190 points of the
complete model are determined (see [11] for details). For
each face, landmark coordinates are concatenated to form
a shape vector, x. The data is then centered by subtracting
the mean face shape, x¯, from each observation. The shape
principle components Ps are derived from the set of mean
subtracted observations (arranged as columns) using PCA.
The synthesis of a face shape (denoted by xˆ) from the shape
model is done as follows,
xˆ = Psbs + x¯, (1)
where bs is a vector in which the first m elements are
normally distributed parameters that determine the linear
combination of shape principal components and the remain-
ing elements are equal to zero. We refer to bs as the shape
coefficients.
Before deriving the texture component of the AM, train-
ing images must be put into correspondence using non-
rigid shape alignment procedure. Each shape normalized and
centered RGB image of a training face is then rearranged as
a vector g. Such vectors for all training faces form a matrix
which is used to compute the texture principle components
Pg by applying PCA. A face texture (denoted by gˆ) is
reconstructed from the texture model as follows,
gˆ = Pgbg + g¯, (2)
where bg are the texture coefficients which are also normally
distributed and g¯ is the mean texture.
The final model is obtained by a PCA on the concate-
nated shape and texture parameter vectors. Let Q denote the
principal components of the concatenated space. The AM
Figure 2. Examples of faces: first row shows real images in the training set, second row shows the corresponding reconstructions of the real faces and the
third row shows synthetic faces sampled from the training face-space.
coefficients (c) are obtained from the corresponding shape
(x) and texture (g) as follows,
c = QT
[
rbs
bg
]
≡ QT
[
wPTs (x− x¯)
PTg (g − g¯)
]
(3)
where w is a scalar that determines the weight of shape
relative to texture.
Figure 1 illustrates the shape vector x (center image)
and the shape free texture vector g (on the right) used to
obtain the AM coefficients.
AM coefficients of a real face are obtained by projecting
its shape x and texture g onto the shape and texture principal
components correspondingly and then combining the shape
and texture parameters into a single vector and projecting it
onto the AM principal components. In order to create the
synthetic faces, we first estimate a d-dimensional Gaussian
distribution N (0d, ~σ2) of the AM coefficients using the
training set of real faces. Then AM coefficients of synthetic
faces are obtained by directly sampling from this distribu-
tion, discarding the samples beyond s standard deviations.4
4. We chose s such that all training samples are within s standard
deviations from the mean.
Theoretically, the expected distance between the samples
from AM distribution to its center is about
√
d standard
deviation units. We observed that the distance of real faces
from the center is indeed close to
√
d standard deviation
units. In other words, AM coefficients are most likely to
lie on the surface of an d-dimensional ellipsoid with radii
ri = k · σi, where k ≈
√
d. Hence to sample synthetic
faces, we use the following process: sample v from a d-
dimensional Gaussian N (0d, 1d), normalize v to the unit
length and multiply coordinate-wise by k~σ. To minimize
the differences between the AM representations of real and
synthetic faces, we apply the same normalization process to
the AM coefficients of the real faces as well.
2.2. Reconstruction
The biometric “password file” of the HoneyFaces system
is composed of records, containing the AM coefficients of
either real or synthetic faces. The coefficients are sufficient
for the authentication process without reconstructing the
face. However, we use reconstructed faces in our privacy
and security analysis, thus in the following, we show how to
reconstruct faces from their corresponding AM coefficients.
First, the shape and texture coefficients are obtained
from the AM coefficients as follows, bs = Qsc and bg =
Qgc, where [QTs Q
T
g ]
T is the AM basis. Then the texture and
shape of the face are obtained via Eq. (1) and (2). Finally, the
texture gˆ is warped onto the shape xˆ, resulting in a facial
image. Figure 2 shows several examples of reconstructed
real faces and synthetic faces, sampled from the estimated
distribution of AM coefficients.
3. Implementation of HoneyFaces Concept
To prevent exfiltration and protect privacy of the users,
we create a very large number of synthetic faces. These
faces can be incorporated in the authentication system in
different ways. For example, the HoneyWords [17] method
stores a list of passwords (one of which is correct and the
rest are fake) per account. In our settings, both the number of
synthetic faces and the ratio of synthetic to real faces should
be large. Thus, the configuration, in which the accounts are
created solely for real users, requires a very large number
of synthetic faces to be attached to each account. Hence, in
such an implementation, during the authentication process, a
user’s face needs to be compared to a long list of candidates
(all fake faces stored with the user name). This would
increase the authentication time by a factor equal to the
synthetic-to-real ratio, negatively affecting the usability of
the system and leading to an undesirable trade off between
privacy and usability.
Another alternative is creating many fake accounts with
a single face as a password. This does not change the
authentication time of the system (compared to a system
with no fake accounts). Since most real systems have very
regular user names (e.g., the first letter of the given name
followed by the family name), it is quite easy to generate
fake accounts following such a convention. As we show in
Section 3.2, this allows inflating the password file to more
than 56.6 TB (when disregarding the storage of user names).
One can also consider a different configuration, aimed
to fool an adversary that knows the correct user names, but
not the real biometrics. Specifically, we can store several
faces in each account (instead of only one) in addition to
the fake accounts (aimed at adversaries without knowledge
of user names). The faces associated with a fake account
are all synthetic. The faces associated with a real account
include one real face of that user and the rest are synthetic
one. In such a configuration the authentication time does
not increase significantly, but the total size of the “biometric
data” and the ratio of real-to-synthetic faces remains large.
Moreover, the adversary that knows the user name still needs
to identify the real face among several synthetic faces.
In this work we implemented and analyzed the configu-
ration in which real and decoy users have an account with
a single password. The majority of the users are fake in
order to hide the real ones. Each user (both real and fake)
has an account name and a password composed of 80 AM
coefficients. These coefficients are derived from the supplied
facial image for real users or artificially generated for decoy
ones.
3.1. Face Modeling
The number of training subjects for the face-space con-
struction should be larger than the number of system users.
This provides a better modeling of the facial appearance,
allowing a large number of synthetic faces to be created,
and protecting the privacy of system’s users as discussed
in Section 4. We used a set of 500 subjects to train the
AM. 270 of them were the users of the HoneyFaces system.
All images in the training set were marked with manual
landmarks using a tool similar to the one used in [11].
We computed a 50-dimensional shape model and a 350-
dimensional texture model as described in Section 2 and we
reduced the dimension of the AM parameters to 80. We note
that this training phase is done once, and needs to contain
the users of the system mainly for optimal authentication
rates. However, as we later discuss in Section 4.3, extracting
biometric information of real users from the face-space is
infeasible.
All representations used in the system were normalized
to unit norm and then multiplied by 7 standard deviations.
This way we forced all samples (real and synthetic) to have
the same norm, making the distribution of distances of real
and synthetic faces very similar to each other (see Figure 5).
3.2. Inflating the Biometric “Password File” with
Synthetic Faces
We used the resulting face-space to generate synthetic
faces. We discarded synthetic faces that fall closer than a
certain distance from the real or previously created syn-
thetic faces. The threshold on the distance between faces of
different identities was set to 4,800, thereby minimizing the
discrepancy between the distance distributions of real and
synthetic faces. This minimum separation distance prevents
collisions between faces and thus the addition of synthetic
faces does not affect the authentication accuracy of the
original system (prior to inflation).
The process of synthetic face generation is very efficient
and takes only 1.2903 × 10−4 seconds on average using
Matlab.
Using 500 training faces we were able to create about
236.5 synthetic faces, with sufficient distance from each
other. We strongly believe that more faces can be generated
(especially if the size of the training set is increased), but
236.5 faces that occupy 56.6 TB seems sufficient for proof
of concept.
3.3. Authentication
The authentication process of most biometric systems
is composed of the user supplying the user name and her
or his facial image. This image (hereafter the test image)
is aligned to conform with the reference image stored for
that user. After the registration, the distance between the
test and reference templates are computed and compared to
some predefined threshold.
Figure 3. The leftmost image shows the landmarks obtained by running the Face++ algorithm on both the reference image (red points) and the test
image (blue points) drawn on the reference image. The center image shows the reference face shape transformed to the test image of the same subject (a
legitimate verification attempt). The rightmost image shows the reference shape transformed to a different subject (an imposter verification attempt). The
transformed reference shape together with the underlying image is used for the computation of the AM coefficients of the test image.
Figure 4. ROC curve of the verification experiment, specified in Section 3.4.
To find the registration between the test and the reference
facial templates in our system, we first reconstruct the facial
shape of the corresponding subject in the database from the
AM coefficients (as shown in Section 2.2). We then run
an automatic landmark detector on the test image (using
Face++ landmark detector [15]) and use these landmarks and
the corresponding locations in the reference shape to find the
scaling, rotation, and translation transformations between
them. Then we apply this transformation to the reference
shape to put it into correspondence with the coordinate
frame of the test image.
The AM coefficients of the test image are computed
using the transformed reference shape and the test image
itself (as shown in Section 2.1) and then compared to the
stored AM coefficients — the password, using the L2 norm.
The threshold on the L2 distance was set to 3,578 which
corresponds to 0.01% of FAR. Note that the threshold is
smaller than the distance between the faces (4,800) used for
synthetic face generation. Figure 3 illustrates the authenti-
cation process for the genuine and imposter attempts.
3.4. Usability as an Authentication System
3.4.1. Accuracy. We ran 270 genuine attempts, comparing
the test image with the corresponding reference image, and
about 4,200,000 impostor attempts (due to the access to
Face++). For a threshold producing an FAR of 0.01%,
our system showed the true acceptance rate (100-FRR) of
93.33%. Figure 4 shows the corresponding ROC curve. Our
tests showed no degradation in FRR/FAR after the inclusion
of synthetic faces.
3.4.2. Efficiency. Finding landmarks in a test image, using
the Face++ landmark detector [15], takes 1.42 seconds per
subject on average. We note that the implementation of the
landmark detector is kept at the Face++ server and thus the
reported times include network communications. Running
the detector locally will significantly reduce the running
time. Obtaining the AM coefficients of a test image and
comparing them to those of the target identity in the database
takes additional 0.53 seconds on average. This brings us to a
total of 1.95 seconds (on average) for a verification attempt.
The system was implemented and tested in Matlab
R2014b 64-bit on Windows 7, in 64-bit OS environment
with Intel’s i7-4790 3.60GHZ CPU and 16GB RAM. Local
implementation that uses C is expected to improve the
running times significantly (though not faster than 1 ms).
4. Privacy Analysis
Our privacy analysis targets an adversary with access to
the inflated biometric “password file”, and is divided into
three cases. The first scenario, discussed in Section 4.1, is
an adversary who has no prior knowledge about the users
of the system. Such an adversary tries to identify the real
users out of the fake ones. The second scenario, discussed
in Section 4.2, concerns an adversary that tries to achieve
the same goal, but has access to a comprehensive, external
source of facial images that adequately represents the world
wide variation (population) in facial appearance but does
not know who the users are. The last scenario assumes that
the adversary obtained the biometric data of all but one out
of the system’s users, and wishes to use this to find the
biometrics of the remaining user. We discuss this case in
Section 4.3.
4.1. Privacy with No Prior Knowledge
We first discuss the scenario in which the adversary has
the full database (e.g., after breaking into the system) and
wishes to identify the real users but has no prior knowledge
concerning the real users. More explicitly, this assumption
means that the adversary does not have a candidate list and
their biometrics, to check if they are in the database.
Definition 1. An inflated password file is a file that contains
N facial templates, n of which correspond to real faces and
remaining N−n are synthetic faces sampled from the same
face-space as the real faces.
Definition 2. A simulated password file is a file that contains
N facial templates, all of which are synthetic faces sampled
from the same face-space.
Lemma 1. An adversary that can distinguish between an
inflated password file and a simulated password file, can
be transformed into an adversary that extracts all the real
users. Similarly, an adversary that can extract real users
from a password file can be used for distinguishing between
inflated and simulated password files.
Proof. We start with the simpler case — transforming an
adversary that can extract the real faces into a distinguisher
between the two files. The reduction is quite simple. If the
adversary can extract real faces out of the password file (and
even only a single real face), we just give it the password
file we have received. If the adversary succeeds in extracting
any face out of it, we conclude that we received the inflated
password file. Otherwise, we conclude that we received a
simulated password file. It is easy to see that the running
time of the distinguishing attack and its success rate are
exactly the same as that of the original extraction adversary.
Now, assume that we are given an adversary that can
distinguish between an inflated password file and a simu-
lated one with probability . We start by recalling that the
advantage of distinguishing between two simulated ones is
necessarily zero. Hence, one can generate a hybrid argu-
ment, of replacing one face at a time in the file. When
we replace a synthetic face with a different synthetic face,
we have not changed the distribution of the file. Thus, the
advantage drops only when we replace a real face with a
synthetic face, which suggests that if there are n real users in
the system, and N total users in the system, we can succeed
in identifying at least one of the real users of the system with
probability greater than or equal to /n and running time
of at most N times the running time of the distinguishing
adversary.
Corollary 1. If the distributions of the inflated password
file and the simulated password file are statistically indistin-
guishable, an adversary with no prior knowledge (of either
user’s biometrics or user names) cannot identify the real
users.
Theoretically, synthetic and real faces are sampled from
the same distribution and thus are indistinguishable accord-
ing to Corollary 1. However, in practice, synthetic faces are
sampled from a parametric distribution which is estimated
from real faces. The larger the set of faces, used to estimate
the distribution, the closer these distributions will be. In
practice, the number of training faces is limited which could
introduce some deviations between the distributions. Our
following analysis shows that these deviations are too small
to distinguish between the distributions of real and synthetic
faces either by statistical tests or by human observers.
The first part of the analysis performs a statistical test of
the AM coefficients of the real and the synthetic faces and
shows that these distributions are indeed very close to each
other. The second part studies the distribution of mutual
distances among real and synthetic faces and reaches the
same conclusion. Finally, we perform a human experiment
on the reconstructed and simulated faces, showing that even
humans can not distinguish between them.
4.1.1. Statistical Tests on the AM Coefficients. The AM
coefficients are well approximated by a Gaussian distri-
bution in all dimensions [11], [23], [34], [39]. Therefore,
sampling AM coefficients for synthetic faces from the cor-
responding distribution is likely to produce representations
that cannot be distinguished by standard hypothesis testing
from real identities. The examples of real and synthetic
distributions for the first 21 dimensions are depicted in
Figure 5 and the following analysis verifies this statement.
First, we show that coefficients of real and synthetic
faces cannot be reliably distinguished based on two sample
Kolmogorov–Smirnov (KS) test. To this end, we sampled a
subset of 500 synthetic samples from 80-dimensional AM
and we compare it to the 500 vectors of coefficients of
training images. We ran the KS test on these two sets for
each of the 80 dimensions and recorded the result of the
hypothesis test and the corresponding p-value. We repeated
this test 50 times, varying the set of synthetic faces. The KS
tests supported the hypothesis that the two samples come
from the same distributions in 98.72% of the cases with a
mean p-value 0.6 (over 50 runs and 80 components, i.e.,
4000 tests). These results show that AM coefficients of real
and synthetic faces are indistinguishable using a two-sample
statistical test.
4.1.2. Distribution of Mutual Distances. We analyzed the
distributions of distances between the real faces, synthetic
ones, and a mixture of both. Figure 6 shows that these
distributions, both in the case of Euclidean distances and
in the case of angular distances,5 are very close. Hence, the
statistical distance between them is negligible, suggesting
that attacks trying to use mutual distances are expected to
be ineffective.
5. Angular distance between the faces is defined to be one minus the
cosine of the included angle between points (treated as vectors).
Figure 5. Comparing the distributions of the AM coefficients for the first 21 (out of 80) principle components. Real face are shown in red and synthetic
ones in blue.
Figure 6. Distributions of distances between different real faces, different synthetic faces, and a mix of them. On the left Euclidean distance, and on the
right angular distance.
4.1.3. Human Experiment. We conducted a human exper-
iment containing two steps. In the first step, the participants
were shown a real face, not used in the experiment, and
its reconstruction.6 In the second step of the experiment,
each participant was presented with the same set of 16 faces
(11 of which were synthetic and 5 of which were real) and
was asked to classify them as real or fake. We also allowed
the users to avoid answering in the case of uncertainty or
fatigue.
The 11 synthetic faces were chosen at random from all
the 236.5 synthetic faces we generated, and the 5 real ones
were chosen at random from the 500 real faces. For the
real faces, we computed the AM coefficients for each real
6. The real face was decomposed into AM coefficients and then recon-
structed.
image and then used the method described in Section 2.2 to
generate the real faces and synthetic faces from the model.
Examples of real and synthetic faces are provided in the
second and third rows, respectively, of Figure 2.
Out of 179 answers we have received, 97 were correct,
showing a success rate of 54.19%. The fake faces received
120 answers, of which 66 were correct (55%). The real faces
received 59 answers, of which 31 were correct (52.5%). Our
analysis shows that the answers for each face are distributed
very similarly to the outcome of a Binomial random variable
with a probability of success at each trial of 0.5.
4.2. Adversary with an External Source of Facial
Images
Next, we analyze the case where an adversary has access
to the inflated “password file” and to an extensive external
source of facial images (e.g. the Internet). We consider two
attack vectors: the first tries to use membership queries with
random facial images to match real users of the system, the
second attempts to distinguish between real and synthetic
faces using a training process on a set of real facial images
unrelated to the users of the system.
4.2.1. Membership Queries. An adversary could use a
different source of facial images to try and run a mem-
bership query against the HoneyFaces system to obtain the
biometric of the real users. To match a random image
from an external source of facial images, the adversary
must run the authentication attempt with all users of the
system (including the fake ones). Our experiments show
that the current implementation takes about 2 seconds per
authentication attempt (mostly due to the landmarking via
Face++). Even under the unrealistic assumption that the
authentication time could be reduced to 1 ms, it would take
about 236 · 0.001 = 226 seconds (slightly more than 2 CPU
years), to run the matching of a single facial image against
236 fake faces. We note that one cannot use a technique to
speed up this search and comparison (such as kd-trees) as
the process of comparison of faces requires aligning them
(based on the landmarks), which cannot be optimized (to
the best of our knowledge).
One can try to identify the membership of a person in
the system by projecting his/her image onto the face-space
of the system and analyzing the distance from the projection
to the image itself. If the face-space was constructed from
system users only, a small distance could reveal the presence
of the person in the face-space. Such an attack can be easily
avoided by building the face-space from a sufficiently large
(external) source of faces. Such a face-space approximates
many different appearances (all combinations of people in
the training set) and thus people unrelated to the users of
the system will also be close to the face-space. We conclude
that a membership attack to obtain the real faces from the
data base is impractical.
4.2.2. Machine Learning Attacks. The task of the adver-
sary who obtained the inflated “biometric password file” is
to distinguish the real faces from the synthetic ones. He
can consider using a classifier that was trained to separate
real faces from the fake ones. To this end the adversary
needs to construct a training set of real and synthetic faces.
Synthetic faces can be generated using the system’s face-
space. However, the real faces of the system are unavailable
to the adversary.
One way an adversary might approach this problem is
by employing a different set of real faces (a substitute set)
to construct the face-space. He then can create a training
set by generating synthetic faces using that space and re-
constructing the real faces from the substitute set following
the algorithms described in Section 2. A trained classifier
could then be used to classify the faces in the biometric
“password file”.
The substitute training set is likely to have different
characteristics than the original one. The adversary could
try to combine the system’s face-space with the substitute
set in attempt to improve the similarity of the training set
to the biometric “password file”. Then, the adversary can
construct the training set of real faces by projecting the
images from the substitute set on the mixed face-space and
reconstructing them as described in Section 2.2. To create a
training set of synthetic faces, the adversary can either use
the mixed face-space or the system’s face-space.
Deep learning and, in particular, convolutional neural
networks (CNN), showed close to human performance in
face verification [25], [33]. It is a common believe that
the success of the CNN in recognition tasks is due to its
ability to extract good features. Moreover, it was shown that
CNN features can be successfully transferred to perform
recognition tasks in similar domains (e.g. [7], [12], [33]).
Such techniques are referred to as fine tuning or transfer
learning. It proceeds by replacing the upper layers of the
fully trained DL network (that solves a related classification
problem) by layers that fit the new recognition problem (the
new layers are initialized randomly). The updated network
is then trained on the new classification problem with the
smaller data set. Note, that most of the network does not
require training, only slight tuning to fit the new classifica-
tion task, and the last layer can be well trained using good
CNN features and a smaller data set.
Following this strategy, we took the VGG-face deep
network [25] that was trained to recognize 2,622 subjects
and applied the transfer learning method to train a DL
network to classify between real and synthetic faces. To this
end, we replaced the last fully connected 2,622 size layer
with a fully connected layer of size 2 and trained this new
architecture in the following settings.
In all experiments we split the training set for training
and validation of the network. Then we applied the trained
network on a subset of system’s data set to classify the
images into real and synthetic. The subset included all real
faces and a subset of the synthetic faces (same size as real
set to balance the classification results).
Setting 1: A face-space was constructed from 500 faces
belonging to the substitute set. The training set included 400
reconstructed real faces and 400 synthetic faces, generated
using the substitute face-space. The validation set included
100 reconstructed real faces and 100 synthetic faces from
the same domain, not included in the training set. The
results on the substitute validation set showed that the DL
network classifies 62.5% of faces correctly. The results on
the system’s set dropped to 53.33%, which is close to
random.
Setting 2: A face-space was constructed by combining
the system’s face-space with the substitute set. The training
set included 400 real faces projected and reconstructed using
the mixed face-space and 400 synthetic faces, generated
using the mixed face-space. The validation set included 100
reconstructed real faces and 100 synthetic faces from the
same domain, not included in the training set. The results
on the validation set showed good classification: 75% of
synthetic faces were classified as synthetic and 93% of real
faces were classified as real. However, the same network
classified all faces of the system’s face set as synthetic. This
result shows that using a mixed face-space to form a training
set is not effective. The prime reason for this is the artifacts
in synthetic images due to variation in viewing conditions
between the sets.
Setting 3: The real training and validation sets were the
same as in Setting 2. The synthetic training and validation
sets were formed by generating synthetic faces using sys-
tem’s face-space. Here the classifier was able to perfectly
classify the validation set, but it classified all system’s faces
as synthetic. This shows that using real and synthetic faces
from different face-spaces introduces even more differences
between them, which do not exist in system’s biometric
“password file”.
To conclude, the state-of-the-art deep learning classifier
showed accuracy of 53.33% in distinguishing between real
and synthetic faces in the system’s biometric “password
file”. This result is close to random guessing.
4.3. Finding the Last User (or what can you Learn
from the Face-Space)
An adversary who obtains the facial images of all but
one of the real users of the system can try and use it for
extracting information about the remaining user from the
password file. If the training set used for constructing the
face-space contains only the users of the system, the follow-
ing simple attack will work: Recall that the authentication
procedure requires removing the mean face from the facial
image obtained in the authentication process. Thus, the mean
of all faces in the training set is stored in the system. The
adversary can find the last user by computing the mean of
the users he holds and solving a simple linear equation.
To mitigate this attack, and to allow better modeling of
the facial appearance, the training set should contain a
significant amount of training faces that are not users of the
system. Note that these additional faces must be discarded
after the face-space is constructed.
Assuming that the training set for the face-space con-
struction was not limited to a set of system users (as is
the case in our implementation), the adversary could try the
following attack. Create K = N − n + 1 face-spaces by
adding each unknown face from the biometric “password
file” in turn to the n−1 real faces that are in the possession
of the adversary. K is equal to the number of synthetic
faces in the biometric “password file” plus one real face.
Then compare these K face-spaces to the one stored in the
system (using statistical distance between the distributions).
Such comparison provides a ranking of unknown faces to
be the n’th real face. If the attack is effective, we expect the
face-space including the n’th user to be highly ranked (i.e.,
to appear in a small percentile). However, if the distribution
of the rankings associated with the face-space including the
n’th real face over random splits of n − 1 known and 1
unknown face is (close to) uniform, then we can conclude
that the adversary does not gain any information about the
last user using this attack.
In our implementation of the attack, we assume that the
adversary knows 269 faces of real users and he tries to
identify the last real user among the synthetic ones. Running
the attack with all synthetic faces is time consuming. To get
statistics of rankings we can use a much smaller subset of
synthetic faces. Specifically, we used 100 synthetic faces
and ran the experiment over 100 randomized splits into 269
known and 1 unknown faces. Figure 7 shows the histogram
of rankings associated with the face-space including the last
real user in 100 experiments. The histogram confirms that
the distribution of rankings is indeed uniform, which renders
the attack ineffective.
An alternative approach, that the adversary may take,
is to analyze the effects of a single face on the face-
space distribution. However, our experiments show that the
statistical distances between neighboring distributions (i.e.,
generated from training sets that differ by a single face)
are insignificant. Specifically, the average statistical distance
between the distribution estimated from the full training set
(of 500 real faces) and all possible sets of 499 faces (forming
500 neighboring sets, each composed of a different subset
of 499 faces) is 1.2809 · 10−5 and the maximal distance
is 6.3696 · 10−5. These distances are negligible compared
to the standard deviations of the face-space Gaussians (the
largest std is 6,473.7 and the smallest is 304.1717). These
small differences suggest that one can use differential pri-
vacy mechanisms with no (or marginal) usability loss (for
example, by using ideas related to [8]) to mitigate attacks
that rely on prior knowledge of the system’s users. We leave
the implementation and evaluation of this mechanism for
future research.
To conclude, the HoneyFaces system protects the privacy
of users even in the extreme case when the adversary
learned all users but one, assuming that the training set for
constructing the face-space contains a sufficiently large set
of additional faces.
5. Security Analysis
We now discuss the various scenarios in which Honey-
Faces improve the security of a biometric data. We start by
discussing the scenario of limited outgoing bandwidth net-
works (such as air-gaped networks), and showing the affects
of the increased file size on the exfiltration times. We follow
by discussing the effects HoneyFaces has on the detection
of the exfiltration process. We conclude the analysis of the
security offered by our solution in the scenario of partial
exposure of the database.
5.1. Exfiltration Times in Limited Outgoing Band-
width
The time needed to exfiltrate a file is easily determined
by the size of the file to be exfiltrated and the bandwidth.
Figure 7. Histograms of rankings associated with the face-space including the last unknown users in comparison to the system’s face-space over 100
random choices of the unknown real face. The histogram agrees with the uniform distribution
When the exfiltration bandwidth is very slow (e.g., in the
air-gap networks studied in [28], [30]), a 640-byte represen-
tation of a face (or 5,120-bit one) takes between 5 seconds
(at 1,000 bits per second rate) to 51 seconds (in the more
realistic 100 bits per second rate). Hence, leaking even a 1
GByte database takes between 92.6 to 926 days (assuming
full bandwidth, and no need for synchronization or error
correction overhead). The size of the password file can be
inflated to contain all the 236.5 faces we created, resulting
in a 56.6 TBytes file size (whose leakage would take about
14,350 years in the faster speed).
A possible way to decrease the file size is to compress
the file. Our experiments show that Linux’s zip version 3.0,
could squeeze the password file by only 4%. It is highly
unlikely that one could devise a compression algorithm that
succeeds in compressing significantly more. In other words,
compressing the face file reduces the number of days to
exfiltrate 1 GByte to 88.9 days (in the faster speed).
One can consider a lossy compression algorithm, for
example by using only the coefficients associated with the
principle components (carrying most information). We show
in Section 5.3 that this approach requires using many coef-
ficients for identification. Hence, we conclude that if the
bandwidth is limited, exfiltration of the full database in
acceptable time limit is infeasible.
5.2. Improved Leakage Detection
The improved leakage detection stems from two possi-
ble defenses: The use of Intrusion Detection Systems (and
Data Loss Prevention products) and the use of a two-server
settings as in HoneyWords.
Intrusion detection systems, such as snort, monitor the
network for suspicious activities. For example, a high outgo-
ing rate of DNS queries may suggest an exfiltration attempt
and raise an alarm [10].7 Similar exfiltration attempts can
7. The analysis reported in [10] suggests that an increased outgoing
DNS queries at the rate of a few dozens a second was deemed suspicious.
The size of a normal DNS query is up to 512 bytes, suggesting that 100
DNS queries per second can carry 51,200 bytes of information, i.e., a
communication rate of at most 409,600 bits/sec.
also increase the detection of data leakage (such as an
end machine which changes its HTTP footprint and starts
sending a large amount of information to some external
server). Hence, an adversary who does not take these tools
into account is very likely to get caught. On the other hand,
an adversary who tries to “lay low” is expected to have
a reduced exfiltration rate, preventing quick leakage and
returning to the scenario discussed in the previous section.
The use of HoneyFaces also allows for a two-server
authentication setting similarly to HoneyWords [17]. The
first server uses a database composed of the real and the
synthetic faces. After a successful login attempt is made
into this system, a second authentication query is sent to
the second server, which holds only the real users of the
system. A successful authentication to the first server that
uses a fake account, is thus detected at the second server,
raising an alarm.
5.3. Analyzing Partial Leakage
We showed that exfiltrating the entire password file in
acceptable time is infeasible if the bandwidth is limited.
Hence, the adversary can decide to pick one of two ap-
proaches (or combine them) when trying to exfiltrate the
file — either leak only partial database (possibly with an
improved ratio of real to synthetic faces), or to leak partial
representations such as the first 10 AM coefficients out of
80 per user.
As we showed in the privacy analysis (Section 4), sta-
tistical tests or Machine Learning methods fail to identify
the real faces among the synthetic ones. Using membership
queries to find real faces in the database is computationally
infeasible without prior knowledge of the real user names.
We conclude that reducing the size of the data set by
identifying the real users or significantly improving the real
to synthetic ratio is impossible.
The second option is to leak a smaller number of the co-
efficients (a partial representation). Leaking a smaller num-
ber of coefficients can be done faster than the entire record,
and allow the adversary to run on his system (possibly with
greater computational power), any algorithm he wishes for
Figure 8. Examples of reconstructions: from left to right 80, 30, 10 coefficients. The resemblance with the original image declines with the number of
coefficients used for reconstruction. Reconstruction with less than 30 coefficients has no similarity to the original image.
the identification of the real users. In the following, we show
that partial representations (that significantly decrease the
size of the data set) do not provide enough information for
successful membership queries.
We experimented with 10 coefficients (i.e., assume that
the adversary leaked the first 10 AM coefficients of all
users). As the adversary does not know the actual threshold
for 10 coefficients, he can try and approximate this value
using the database. Our proposed method for this estimation
is based on computing the distance distribution for 30,000
faces from the database, and setting a threshold for authenti-
cation corresponding to the 0.01% “percentile” of the mutual
distances. We then take test sets of real users’ faces and of
outsiders’ faces and for each face from these sets, computed
the minimal distance from this face to all the faces in the
reduced biometric ”password file”. We assume that if this
distance is smaller than the threshold, then the face was in
the system, otherwise we conclude that the face was not in
it.
Our experiments show that for the 0.01% threshold,
98.90% of the outsider set and 99.26% of the real users
were below the threshold. In other words, there is almost no
difference between the chance of determining that a user of
the system is indeed a user vs. determining that an outsider
is a user of the system. This supports the claim that 10
coefficients are insufficient to distinguish between real users
and outsiders.
We also used a smaller threshold which tried to maxi-
mize the success rate of an outsider to successfully match
to a real face. For this smaller threshold, 71.08% of the
outsiders were below it compared with 74.07% of the real
users.
To further illustrate the effects of partial representation
on the reconstructed face, we show in Figure 8 the recon-
struction of faces from 80, 30, and 10 coefficients, compared
with the real face. As can be seen, faces reconstructed from
30 coefficients are somewhat related to the original face, but
faces reconstructed from 10, bare little resemblance to the
original. Although it is possible to match a degraded face
to the corresponding original when a small number of faces
are shown (Figure 8), visual matching is impossible among
236.5 faces.
Thus, an adversary wishing to leak partial information
about an image, needs to leak more than 10 coefficients.
To conclude, exfiltrating even a partial set of faces (or
parts of the records) does not constitute a plausible attack
vector against the HoneyFaces system.
6. Summary
In this paper we explored the use of synthetic faces for
increasing the security and privacy of face-based authenti-
cation schemes. We have proposed a new mechanism for
inflating the database of users (HoneyFaces) which guar-
antees users’ privacy with no usability loss. Furthermore,
HoneyFaces offers improved resilience against exfiltration
(both the exfiltration itself and its detection). We also
showed that this mechanism does not interfere with the basic
authentication role of the system and that the idea allows
the introduction of a two-server authentication solution as
in HoneyWords.
Future work can explore the application of the Hon-
eyFaces idea to other biometric traits (such as iris and
fingerprints). We believe that due to the similar nature
of iris codes (that also follow multi-dimensional Gaussian
distribution), the application of the concept is going to be
quite straightforward.
Acknowledgments
The funds received under the binational UK Engi-
neering and Physical Sciences Research Council project
EP/M013375/1 and Israeli Ministry of Science and Tech-
nology project 3-11858, “Improving cyber security using
realistic synthetic face generation” allowed this work to be
carried out.
References
[1] J. L. Araque, M. Baena, B. E. Chalela, D. Navarro, and P. R. Viz-
caya. Synthesis of fingerprint images. In Pattern Recognition, 2002.
Proceedings. 16th International Conference on, volume 2, pages 422–
425. IEEE, 2002.
[2] V. Blanz and T. Vetter. A morphable model for the synthesis
of 3d faces. In Proceedings of the 26th annual conference on
Computer graphics and interactive techniques, pages 187–194. ACM
Press/Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1999.
[3] R. Cappelli. Fingerprint sample synthesis. In Encyclopedia of
Biometrics, Second Edition, pages 668–679. 2015.
[4] T. F. Cootes, G. J. Edwards, and C. J. Taylor. Active Appearance
Models. IEEE Trans. Pattern Anal. Mach. Intell., 23(6):681–685,
2001.
[5] J. Cui, Y. Wang, J. Huang, T. Tan, and Z. Sun. An iris image synthesis
method based on PCA and super-resolution. In 17th International
Conference on Pattern Recognition, ICPR 2004, Cambridge, UK,
August 23-26, 2004., pages 471–474, 2004.
[6] Y. Dodis, R. Ostrovsky, L. Reyzin, and A. D. Smith. Fuzzy Extractors:
How to Generate Strong Keys from Biometrics and Other Noisy Data.
SIAM J. Comput., 38(1):97–139, 2008.
[7] J. Donahue, Y. Jia, O. Vinyals, J. Hoffman, N. Zhang, E. Tzeng, and
T. Darrell. Decaf: A deep convolutional activation feature for generic
visual recognition. In International Conference in Machine Learning
(ICML), 2014.
[8] C. Dwork, K. Talwar, A. Thakurta, and L. Zhang. Analyze gauss:
optimal bounds for privacy-preserving principal component analysis.
In D. B. Shmoys, editor, Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC
2014, New York, NY, USA, May 31 - June 03, 2014, pages 11–20.
ACM, 2014.
[9] G. J. Edwards, T. F. Cootes, and C. J. Taylor. Face Recognition
Using Active Appearance Models. In Computer Vision - ECCV’98,
5th European Conference on Computer Vision, Freiburg, Germany,
June 2-6, 1998, Proceedings, Volume II, pages 581–595, 1998.
[10] ExtraHop. Detecting data exfiltration. Available online at https:
//www.extrahop.com/solutions/data-exfiltration-detection/. Accessed
October 20th, 2016.
[11] S. J. Gibson, C. J. Solomon, and A. P. Bejarano. Synthesis of Pho-
tographic Quality Facial Composites using Evolutionary Algorithms.
In British Machine Vision Conference, BMVC 2003, Norwich, UK,
September, 2003. Proceedings, pages 1–10, 2003.
[12] R. B. Girshick, J. Donahue, T. Darrell, and J. Malik. Rich Feature
Hierarchies for Accurate Object Detection and Semantic Segmenta-
tion. In 2014 IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern
Recognition, CVPR 2014, Columbus, OH, USA, June 23-28, 2014,
pages 580–587, 2014.
[13] C. Gottschlich and S. Huckemann. Separating the real from the
synthetic: minutiae histograms as fingerprints of fingerprints. IET
Biometrics, 3(4):291–301, 2014.
[14] C. Imdahl, S. Huckemann, and C. Gottschlich. Towards generating
realistic synthetic fingerprint images. In 9th International Symposium
on Image and Signal Processing and Analysis, ISPA 2015, Zagreb,
Croatia, September 7-9, 2015, pages 78–82, 2015.
[15] M. Inc. Face++ Research Toolkit . www.faceplusplus.com, Dec.
2013.
[16] A. Juels and T. Ristenpart. Honey Encryption: Encryption beyond the
Brute-Force Barrieri. IEEE Security & Privacy, 12(4):59–62, 2014.
[17] A. Juels and R. L. Rivest. Honeywords: making password-cracking
detectable. In Sadeghi et al. [29], pages 145–160.
[18] A. Juels and M. Wattenberg. A Fuzzy Commitment Scheme. In
J. Motiwalla and G. Tsudik, editors, CCS ’99, Proceedings of the
6th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security,
Singapore, November 1-4, 1999., pages 28–36. ACM, 1999.
[19] M. U. Kuecken and A. C. Newell. A model for fingerprint formation.
In Europhysics Letters, volume 68, pages 141–146, 2004.
[20] M. Lewis. Face-space-R: towards a unified account of face recogni-
tion. Visual Cognition, 11(1):29–69, 2004.
[21] M. Li, W. Zuo, and D. Zhang. Convolutional network for attribute-
driven and identity-preserving human face generation. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1608.06434, 2016.
[22] S. Makthal and A. Ross. Synthesis of iris images using markov
random fields. In 13th European Signal Processing Conference,
EUSIPCO 2005, Antalya, Turkey, September 4-8, 2005, pages 1–4,
2005.
[23] I. Matthews and S. Baker. Active Appearance Models Revisited. In-
ternational Journal of Computer Vision, 60(2):135 – 164, November
2004.
[24] M. L. Mazurek, S. Komanduri, T. Vidas, L. Bauer, N. Christin, L. F.
Cranor, P. G. Kelley, R. Shay, and B. Ur. Measuring password
guessability for an entire university. In Sadeghi et al. [29], pages
173–186.
[25] O. M. Parkhi, A. Vedaldi, and A. Zisserman. Deep Face Recognition.
In British Machine Vision Conference, 2015.
[26] N. Provos. A Virtual Honeypot Framework. In M. Blaze, editor,
Proceedings of the 13th USENIX Security Symposium, August 9-13,
2004, San Diego, CA, USA, pages 1–14. USENIX, 2004.
[27] N. K. Ratha, S. Chikkerur, J. H. Connell, and R. M. Bolle. Generating
Cancelable Fingerprint Templates. IEEE Trans. Pattern Anal. Mach.
Intell., 29(4):561–572, 2007.
[28] E. Ronen and A. Shamir. Extended Functionality Attacks on IoT
Devices: The Case of Smart Lights. In IEEE European Symposium on
Security and Privacy, EuroS&P 2016, Saarbru¨cken, Germany, March
21-24, 2016, pages 3–12. IEEE, 2016.
[29] A. Sadeghi, V. D. Gligor, and M. Yung, editors. 2013 ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS’13,
Berlin, Germany, November 4-8, 2013. ACM, 2013.
[30] A. Shamir. Side Channel Attacks - Past, Present, and Future. Blackhat
Europe, 2014.
[31] C. J. Solomon, S. J. Gibson, and J. J. Mist. Interactive evolutionary
generation of facial composites for locating suspects in criminal
investigations. Applied Soft Computing, 13(7):3298–3306, 2013.
[32] K. Sumi, C. Liu, and T. Matsuyama. Study on synthetic face
database for performance evaluation. In International Conference
on Biometrics, pages 598–604. Springer, 2006.
[33] Y. Taigman, M. Yang, M. Ranzato, and L. Wolf. Web-scale training
for face identification. In IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and
Pattern Recognition, CVPR 2015, Boston, MA, USA, June 7-12, 2015,
pages 2746–2754, 2015.
[34] G. Tzimiropoulos and M. Pantic. Optimization Problems for Fast
AAM Fitting in-the-Wild. In IEEE International Conference on
Computer Vision, ICCV, pages 593–600, 2013.
[35] U. Uludag, S. Pankanti, S. Prabhakar, and A. K. Jain. Biometric
Cryptosystems: Issues and Challenges. Proceedings of the IEEE,
92(6):948–960, 2004.
[36] M. Upmanyu, A. M. Namboodiri, K. Srinathan, and C. V. Jawahar.
Blind authentication: a secure crypto-biometric verification protocol.
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 5(2):255–
268, 2010.
[37] T. Valentine. A unified account of the effects of distinctiveness,
inversion, and race in face recognition. The Quarterly Journal of
Experimental Psychology, 43(2):161–204, 1991.
[38] M. Weir, S. Aggarwal, B. de Medeiros, and B. Glodek. Password
Cracking Using Probabilistic Context-Free Grammars. In 30th IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P 2009), 17-20 May 2009,
Oakland, California, USA, pages 391–405. IEEE Computer Society,
2009.
[39] H. Wu, X. Liu, and G. Doretto. Face alignment via boosted ranking
model. In 2008 IEEE Computer Society Conference on Computer
Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR 2008), 24-26 June 2008,
Anchorage, Alaska, USA, 2008.
[40] S. N. Yanushkevich, V. P. Shmerko, A. Stoica, P. S. P. Wang, and
S. N. Srihari. Introduction to synthesis in biometrics. In Image
Pattern Recognition - Synthesis and Analysis in Biometrics, pages
5–30. 2007.
[41] L. Zhang, L. Lin, X. Wu, S. Ding, and L. Zhang. End-to-end photo-
sketch generation via fully convolutional representation learning. In
Proceedings of the 5th ACM on International Conference on Multi-
media Retrieval, pages 627–634. ACM, 2015.
[42] J. Zuo, N. A. Schmid, and X. Chen. On generation and analysis
of synthetic iris images. IEEE Trans. Information Forensics and
Security, 2(1):77–90, 2007.
